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This thesis attempts to examine the effect of firm characteristics (ownership, size and 
industry) on earnings by using twins data. We control for the unobserved ability and 
family effect by using monozygotic (MZ) twins. Our within-twin-pair fixed-effects 
(FE) estimates show that there are indeed wage premiums associated with firm 
characteristics. Firstly, there is a true wage premium from foreign firms. Return to 
foreign firms under FE estimates is reported as 27.7 percent, comparable to 24 
percent using OLS estimates. Secondly, larger firms exhibit a wage premium of 11.6 
percent. Thirdly, industry differential also exists in specific sectors such as social 
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1 Introduction 
Economists have long noticed that the wage rate of workers varies with 
characteristics (e.g., ownership, size and industry) of their employers. It is well 
established that foreign owned firms pay higher average wages than domestically 
owned ones (Aitken et al.,1996; Feliciano and Lipsey, 1999; Lipsey and Sjoholm, 
2001，Gorg et al.’ 2002; Griffith and Simpson, 2003; Velde and Morrissey, 2003), 
and larger firms pay more than smaller ones (Brown and Medoff, 1989; Idson and 
Feaster, 1990; Schmidt and Zimmerman, 1991; Albaek et al., 1998; Abowd et al., 
1999; Bayard and Troske, 1999; Oi and Idson, 1999; Gardner, 2003; Ferrer and Lluis, 
2004). Moreover, there are also large and persistent wage differentials across 
industries (Dickens and Katz, 1987; Helwege, 1989; Krueger and Summers, 1987， 
1988; and Murphy and Topel, 1987，1990). 
Some of the prevalent explanations for such return include that, employers have 
a greater ability to pay (Albaek et al., 1998), firms compensate workers for less 
interesting job amenities and worse working conditions (Lester, 1967; Masters, 1969; 
Scherer, 1976; Martins, 2004), firms pay more to reduce monitoring cost (Oi, 1983), 
employers may share with workers the rents produced by their specific assets (e.g. 
products or technologies) in order to prevent the costly turnover (Fosfuri et al., 
2001). 
Despite of these suggestions based on true wage differentials, the explanation of 
unmeasured ability attracts more attention: Firms pay more simply because they 
select workers that are more skilled in dimensions unobservable to the researchers 
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(Hamermesh，1980; Eaton and White, 1983; Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984; Dickens and 
Katz, 1987; Topel, 1989; Black et a l , 1999; Troske, 1999; Martins, 2004). Despite a 
vast amount of evidence indicating wage premium associated with these firm 
characteristics, it is still unclear whether these firms pay higher wages for workers 
with identical qualifications and capabilities. The problem is that an ordinary least 
squares (OLS) estimation cannot prove causality. Specifically, workers with more 
intelligence, motivation, or advantageous family backgrounds will get higher wages 
even if they do dot enter foreign or large firms. In other words, there can be a 
correlation between unobserved individual ability and firm attributes, which leads to 
the observed spurious correlation between firm attributes and earnings. 
This paper attempts to examine the effect of firm characteristics on earnings of 
workers by using twins data to control for the unobserved ability and family effect. 
Since monozygotic (from the same egg, MZ) twins are genetically identical and have 
similar family backgrounds, taking the within-twin-pair difference will eliminate the 
unobserved ability or family effect. As long as MZ twins are identical with respect to 
such factors and whether they enter foreign or large firms is randomly generated, 
within-twin-pair estimates will be unbiased. 
Our within-twin-pair fixed-effects estimates show that there are indeed wage 
premiums associated with firm characteristics. Firstly, there is a true wage premium 
from foreign firms. The return to foreign firms under FE estimates is 27.7 percent, 
which is even larger than the OLS estimate of 24 percent. These findings suggest that 
foreign firms indeed pay more to individuals with the same ability. For the case of 
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firm size, our FE estimates also give a premium of 11.6 percent using FE estimates. 
Industry differential also exists in specific sectors such as social service, which 
exhibits a premium of 11.2 percent after controlling for ability. Return to commercial 
sector decreases greatly using FE estimates, indicating higher return in commercial 
firms are greatly due to the higher capability of employees in that sector. 
This paper contributes to the extensive literature on wage premium from firms of 
different characteristics in three ways. Firstly, by using a sample of twins, we 
provide a way to control for the omitted variable bias and to directly measure the 
value of specific firm characteristics without the complication of the omitted variable 
bias encountered in most of the previous studies. Secondly, this study investigates 
returns to firms of specific characteristics as ownership, firm size and industry type 
together, differing from existing literature testing only one aspect of such 
characteristics. Finally, it is also the first to study returns to specific firms using 
twins data collected from China, and one of the first from developing countries. 
The structure for the rest of the proposal is as follows: Section 2 reviews relevant 
literature, Section 3 and 4 describe the methodology and data respectively, Section 5 
discusses the basic empirical findings, and Section 6 draws some concluding marks. 
2 Literature Review 
2.1 Literature Review on Foreign-wage Premium 
The empirical literature examining the impact of foreign firms on host-country labor 
markets typically found that such firms pay higher wages. 
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In an important study, Aitken et al. (1996) used establishment level 
cross-sections for Mexico, the USA and Venezuela and found evidence of higher 
wages in foreign firms in the three countries covered. Using OLS, the premium 
ranges between 38 percent in Mexico and 12 percent in the US. Feliciano and Lipsey 
(1999) focused on the US case using industry-state ownership cells and again found 
evidence of a positive wage differential, but it disappeared (for the manufacturing 
sector only) after controlling for firm characteristics. Griffith and Simpson (2003) 
presented estimates for the case in UK, finding positive premiums for foreign firms 
for different specifications. 
In research focusing only on developing countries, Lipsey and Sjoholm (2001) 
studied the Indonesian case and found a premium of 12 percent for blue-collar 
workers and 22 percent for white-collar workers. They drew on a 1996 cross-section 
of plants and regressed average wages on plant characteristics, including their 
domestic or foreign ownership type. Velde and Morrissey (2003) examined the cases 
of five African countries (Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya, Zambia and Zimbabwe) and 
again found that foreign firms pay higher wages (the premiums range between 8 
percent and 23 percent), and there is a tendency in some countries for more skilled 
workers. Similar results were documented for Ghana by Gorg et al. (2002). 
Up to our readings of previous literature, there are generally five possible 
explanations for foreign-wage premium: increased labor demand, rent sharing, 
compensating differentials, unobservable heterogeneity, and on-the-job training. 
The first explanation is that foreign firms, as they enter the domestic country, 
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may increase labor demand (Martins, 2004). This will necessarily occur in the case 
of greenfield investments. It may also possibly occur in the case of acquisitions if, 
for instance, foreign multinationals decide to expand production in the host country 
beyond the previous output level of the acquired firm. Moreover, should the labor 
supply curve be positively sloped, wages for the marginal workers hired by 
multinationals will be higher than those of infra-marginal workers. 
A second explanation is that multinationals may pay a wage premium to 
dissuade workers from moving to other firms or disrupting activity. This is consistent 
with the Ownership-Location-Internalization model of Dunning (1977), in particular 
with the internalization motive. Under this model, foreign firms own special assets 
(e.g. new products or technologies) that are more profitably exploited abroad via FDI 
than via exporting (or franchising schemes). Foreign firms would then pay higher 
wages in order to prevent the costly turnover, which would occur once quitters 
provided insights about the multinationals' specific assets to competing firms 
(Fosfuri et al., 2001). Alternatively, or complementarily, foreign firms may share 
with workers some of the rents produced by those assets, driving their wages above 
those of comparable individuals working in firms that do not generate such rents. 
A third explanation for the stylized fact that foreign firms pay higher wages is 
compensating differentials. For instance, multinationals may provide less interesting 
job amenities than domestic firms. Workers would thus have to be compensated in 
the form of higher wages in order to take jobs in foreign-owned firms (Martins, 
2004). 
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In addition, foreign firms may select workers that are more skilled in dimensions 
unobservable to the researcher. For instance, given the larger size of multinationals, 
both when taken individually in each host country and particularly when taken 
jointly in all countries in which they operate, these firms may benefit from scale of 
economies in setting up sophisticated human resource departments. This would allow 
these firms to screen and hire the best applicants for their vacancies, possibly also 
along dimensions of skill that are not observable to researchers. In this case, the 
wage differential attributed to multinationals would be spurious and no causal impact 
of foreign ownership upon wages could be inferred. 
Finally, it is argued that workers receiving on-the-job training in foreign firms 
experience higher wage growth than workers being trained in domestic firms (Gorg 
et al., 2002). Training is more beneficial in foreign firms because they have access to 
firm specific assets that give them a technological advantage over domestic firms in 
the same industry (Caves, 1996)，which may also lead to more able workers being 
chosen in the foreign sector that would also affect the wage profile. Yet another 
possibility is that monitoring is more difficult in foreign firms causing firms to pay 
efficiency wages. Such wage premiums may induce the firms to engage in more 
specific training (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999). 
2.2 Literature Review on Size-wage Premium 
In their seminal paper, Brown and Medoff (1989) examined the magnitude and 
causes of the firm-size wage premium in the US. Their results showed that ceteris 
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paribus working for a large firm (i.e. a firm that is double the size of another) 
provides a wage premium of between 1.5 and 3.8 percent. The study of Idson and 
Feaster (1990) relative to the US is the first to address the potential selectivity 
problem by applying the two-step estimation procedure. Their findings, based on a 
discrete measure of firm size (5 categories), showed that controlling for selection 
effects decreases the magnitude of the size wage gap. 
Such findings were supported using data of countries other than the US. The 
paper of Schmidt and Zimmerman (1991) supported the existence of a significant 
firm-size wage premium in West Germany. Moreover, their results indicated that the 
magnitude and significance of this premium is not reduced by the addition of many 
control variables, including tenure, innovative activities of firms, industry dummies, 
demographic variables, and work characteristics. Main and Reilly (1993) focused on 
the UK using a discrete measure of the establishment size (3 categories). Moreover, 
they tried to correct for the potential selection bias by adopting the same 
methodology as in Idson and Feaster (1990). Their results showed the existence of a 
wage gap of around 18 per cent between large and small establishments. The size 
wage differential within Italian firms has been investigated by Brunello and Colussi 
(1998). Using a discrete measure of firm size (6 categories) and controlling for a 
potential selectivity bias, the authors found that the wage differential between small 
and large firms is not significantly different from zero. In other words, their results 
suggested that any wage premium is due to differences in the observed 
characteristics and selection effects. 
14 
The study of Albaek et al (1998) is the first to use a continuous measure of the 
establishment size (i.e. the exact number of employees per establishment) and to 
compare the size wage elasticity across Scandinavian countries. The authors found 
large plant-size effects even after controlling for individual and job characteristics as 
well as for selection effects. Abowd et al. (1999) used a large matched worker-firm 
panel data set for France and found that individual heterogeneity rather than firm 
heterogeneity accounts for most of the wage gap between size categories. Gardner 
(2003) used reported job satisfaction data to examine whether the observed positive 
relationship between employer size and wages captures a compensating differential, 
and they found little difference in the responses observed for medium-sized and large 
plants. Ferrer and Lluis (2004) examined the returns to unmeasured skills in Canada 
considering the non random assignment of workers into firms of different sizes. They 
applied GMM techniques to longitudinal data for the period 1993-98. Their findings, 
based on a discrete measure of firm size (3 categories), showed that moves are 
equally distributed across firms of different sizes. They also suggested that moving to 
a larger firm generally increases the average wage, while joining a smaller firm may 
not lead to a wage cut. Finally, they indicated that unmeasured skills (e.g. initiative, 
ambition) are not significantly better rewarded within large firms. A similar result 
has been obtained for Portugal by Silva (2004). Using longitudinal 
employer-employee data, covering the period 1993-98, the latter found that observed 
skills generate higher returns in larger firms while unmeasured abilities are better 
rewarded in smaller firms. 
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One possible explanation for the elasticity between size and wages is that large 
employers have a greater ability-to-pay. The argument is that the latter are more 
/ 
likely to operate in imperfect competitive markets (Albaek et al.’ 1998). Therefore, 
large employers can accumulate more monopoly rents that they may share with their 
workers (Slichter, 1950; Weiss, 1966; Mellow, 1982). 
According to Hamermesh (1980), large employers hire higher-quality workers 
due to their greater capital intensity and the capital-skill complementarity, which 
require advanced technologies and in turn more skilled labor. Black et al. (1999) 
argued that cost advantages allow large employers to implement stronger training 
systems, which are essential for an efficient use of advanced technologies. Troske 
(1999) developed a complementary argument explaining that if there are fixed costs 
associated with employing high-skilled workers, large employers should have 
advantages in matching them together. 
Compensating wage differentials may also account for the employer-size wage 
premium. For a long time, working conditions were considered to be worse within 
large organizations. Large employers were suspected to offer a more impersonal 
work atmosphere (Lester, 1967), to decrease the freedom of action and scheduling 
(Masters, 1969), and to generate longer commuting (Scherer, 1976). However, Oi 
and Idson (1999) challenged this perspective by arguing that large firms typically 
offer jobs with better working conditions. Moreover, they suggest for the US that 
observable working conditions are better within large firms and therefore cannot 
contribute to the firm-size wage premium. 
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Efficiency wage models provide a complementary explanation for the 
employer-size wage premium. Large firms that in general face higher monitoring 
costs，may pay efficiency wages, i.e. wages that are above the market clearing level 
for a given quality of labor (Eaton and White, 1983) to reduce these costs. In the 
Shapiro and Stiglitz's model (1984), the level of efficiency wage is negatively 
correlated with the detection rate. Since the detection rate is supposed to be lower 
within large organizations, efficiency wages are expected to increase with employer 
size. Another explanation related to monitoring cost is managers' ability by Oi's 
(1983). In Oi's model the most skilled managers work in the largest firms but must 
divide their time between monitoring workers and managing the firm. The model 
assumes that the more skilled managers are better at managing the firm than they are 
at monitoring workers, while the more skilled workers require less monitoring. 
Hence, one would expect that the more skilled managers hire the more skilled 
workers, with a resulting firm-size wage premium observed if the skill level of 
managers is not controlled for. 
There is some evidence in industrialized countries that larger firms may pay 
higher wages to avoid unionism among their workers. Velenchik (1996) examined 
this possibility for Zimbabwe by including a control for whether a firm is unionized 
in the wage determination equation and found that this reduces the magnitude of the 
employer-size wage effect between small and medium sized firms, but not for other 
parts of the wage distribution. 
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2.3 Literature Review on Industry Wage Differentials 
Slichter (1950) was among the first economists to study the industry wage structure. 
After examining the average hourly wage rate of skilled and unskilled male workers 
in manufacturing industries between 1923 and 1949，Slichter was struck by the 
magnitude of industry wage differences for comparable workers. He found that 
industry, positively correlated with profit margins, and negatively correlated with the 
payroll to income ratio. Using regression analysis, Wachtel and Betsey (1972) 
analyze the impact of one-digit industries and three occupation groups on the 
residual of wages after controlling for education, experience and demographic factors. 
They concluded that there is a substantial portion of the variance in wage earnings 
that can be explained by industry structure after the effects of personal characteristics 
have been eliminated. After carefully reviewing empirical studies on dual labor 
market theory, Cain (1976) concluded that the importance of industry affiliation in 
determining wages is the most convincing evidence in support of dual labor markets. 
One explanation of persistent measured wage differences among observationally 
similar workers in competitive labor markets is that true wage differentials exist 
across industries, even for identical workers. Such industry wage differentials arise in 
models of compensating differences (Rosen, 1986), rent sharing (Katz and Summers, 
1989; Blanchflower et al” 1990; Nickell and Wadhwani, 1990) and efficiency wages 
(Katz, 1986)，among others. For instance, Blanchflower et al. (1990) using British 
establishment data from 1984，argued that wage determination is best seen as a kind 
of sharing in which workers' bargaining power is influenced by conditions in the 
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external labor market. Nickell and Wadhwani (1990) investigated wage 
determination at the individual firm level focusing on insider versus outsider effects 
and found that: insider forces have a significant impact on wage determination, in 
particular own prices and productivity have well determined effects at the firm level. 
An alternative explanation of measured inter-industry wage differences rest on 
differences in workers' productive abilities that are not captured in individual-level 
data sets: high-ability workers earn high wages; industries that employ 
proportionately more high-ability workers pay higher average wages to 
observationally equivalent workers. The simplest unmeasured-ability explanation of 
inter-industry wage differences is based on two observations. First, there is evidence 
that workers are sorted across industries by measured human capital: Dickens and 
Katz (1987) and Topel (1989) found that observable dimensions of human capital 
that are associated with higher wages (such as education and experience) are also 
associated with employment in high-wage industries. Second, there may be a great 
deal of variation in unmeasured human capital: among all workers with a college 
degree, for instance, only some have performed well at demanding institutions. 
Given longitudinal data on the wages of a given individual as he or she switches 
industries, much of the existing empirical work on the unmeasured-ability 
explanation of the inter-industry wage differences attempts to use first-differenced 
(or fixed-effects) estimation to eliminate the impact of unmeasured ability on the 
measured industry effect. Krueger and Summers (1988) presented estimates of the 
effects of industry switches on wage through a first-differenced regression on 
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matched May Current Population Survey (CPS) data. They found that workers 
moving from high- to low-wage industries experience a wage decrease, while those 
moving from low- to high-wage industries experience a wage increase. Moreover, 
the size of these wage changes is similar to the difference between the relevant 
industry-wage differentials estimated in a cross-section. They concluded that their 
empirical finding casts "serious doubt on unmeasured labor quality explanations for 
inter-industry wage differences". Murphy and Topel (1987, 1990) also used 
longitudinal data to estimate first-differenced regressions. They used a sample of 
males from matched March CPS data. In contrast to Krueger and Summers, they 
reported that industry switchers receive only 27 to 36 percent of the cross sectional 
differential. They thus concluded that "nearly two-thirds of the observed industry 
difference is estimated to be caused by unobserved individual components". Gibbons 
and Katz (1992) constructed a model showing that if matching is important then 
endogenous job-change decisions can create important self-selection biases even in 
first-differenced estimates of industry wage differentials. They also analyzed a 
sample that approximates the experiment of exogenous job loss and found that (i) the 
wage change experienced by a typical industry switcher closely resembles the 
difference in the relevant industry differentials estimated in a cross-section, and (ii) 
pre-displacement industry affiliation plays an important role in post-displacement 
wage determination. More recently, Reilly and Zanchi (2000) examined three 
implementation and interpretation issues associated with Krueger and Summers' 
(1988) method for calculating inter-industry wage differentials. They showed that 
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making explicit the restriction on the coefficients - that the employment-weighted 
average industry wage effect over all industries is zero -produces an industry wage 
effect for all industries, including the industry that the researcher must exclude in the 
estimation to avoid the standard dummy variable trap. Abowd and Kramarz (2000), 
using data from the State of Washington, showed that person effects (net of 
observable non-time-varying characteristics) explain about half of the raw 
inter-industry wage differential (net of all observable characteristics) and firm 
heterogeneity accounts for half of the raw inter-industry wage differential. 
2.4 Literature Review on MZ Twins Approach 
In his dissertation in 1932, Gorseline firstly tried siblings' data, studying whether 
education really paid by contrasting different educational experiences of brothers. 
Since then a rash of publications analyzed different sibling samples (Corcoran et al., 
1976; Jencks and Brown, 1977; Chamberlain and Griliches, 1977; Brittain, 1977; 
Olneck, 1977). During recent years, several studies pursued this approach by using 
MZ twins. In a series of studies published between 1976 and 1980，Taubman and his 
associates (Behrman and Taubman, 1976; Taubman, 1976a, 1976b) analyzed a set of 
about 1,000 MZ and 900 dizygotic (DZ) twin pairs based on the National Academy 
of Sciences-National Research Council (NAS-NRC) Twin Registry sample of white 
male army veterans. Behrman and Taubman's estimates stood the only ones of their 
kind until Ashenfelter and Krueger's (1994) study of participants in the 1991 Annual 
Twins Day Festival in Twinsburg, Ohio. Ashenfelter and Rouse's study (1998) 
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incorporated data from the 1992 and 1993 Twinsburg festivals, and Rouse (1999) 
further added data from the 1995 festival. The Twinsburg studies sparked interest in 
analyzing still other data on MZ twins. Behrman and Rosenzweig (2002) used data 
from the Minnesota Twin Registry. In addition to these studies based on U.S. samples, 
Miller et al. (1995) used the Australian Twin Register, Isacsson (1999) used the 
Swedish Twin Registry, and Bonjour et al. (2003) used the London Twins Research 
Unit. 
3 Method 
Our empirical work will focus on estimating the log earnings equation given as 
where the subscript i refers to individual i. y^ is the logarithm of the earnings. F. is 
the firm characteristics including firm ownership, firm size, and industry type. X； is 
the set of observed family variables. Z, is a set of observed individual variables that 
affect earnings, including age, age squared, gender, job tenure and years of education. 
represents a set of unobservable variables that also affect earnings, i.e., ability or 
unobserved family effect. €. is the disturbance term, which is assumed to be 
independent of Z. and 
The ordinary least squares (OLS) estimate of the firm characteristics effect in 
equation (1), where P is generally biased. The bias arises because we normally do 
not have perfect measures of//,.，which is very likely to be correlated with F" 
Intuitively, taking firm size for instance, the cross-sectional comparison of large 
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firms to small ones will not identify the firm characteristics effect even if the two 
groups of workers are identical with respect to observed variables. This is because 
people who enter firms of different sizes may differ in other unobserved 
characteristics that affect income. As discussed in the introduction, large firm 
employees could be more capable, motivated, or blessed with advantageous family 
backgrounds, and if these advantages are not completely accounted for, then the firm 
characteristics dummy in OLS estimations will pick up the effect of these variables. 
It is therefore difficult to ascertain how much of the empirical association between 
earnings and the firm characteristics is due to the causal effect of firm characteristics 
and how much is due to unobserved factors that influence both earnings and firm 
characteristics. 
Several approaches could be used to tackle this omitted variable bias problem. 
The first approach is to seek richer datasets that can be used to control more 
extensively for measures of ability, family background, and the like. The main 
problem with this approach is that the controls inevitably remain incomplete. 
Nonetheless, we will take advantage of our rich dataset and include many control 
variables to reduce the omitted variable bias. 
A second approach to solve the omitted variable problem is to apply the 
fixed-effects estimator to our twins sample. Since monozygotic (from the same egg) 
twins are genetically identical and have similar family background, they should have 
the same . Thus, taking the within-twin-pair difference will eliminate the 
unobservable ability and family effect , which has caused the omitted variable 
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bias in the OLS estimation. Intuitively, by contrasting the earnings of identical twins 
with different firm characteristics status, we could ensure that the correlation we 
observe between firm characteristics and earnings is not due to a correlation between 
firm characteristics and a worker's ability and family background. 
The fixed effects (FE) model can be specified as follows. The earnings equations 
of a pair of twins are given as, 
⑵)；丨= + P F , , + “ + / / , + f 1, 
(3)}'2/ PPii + Y^ii + J^i + 
where ；y力.(j = 1, 2) is the logarithm of the earnings of the first and second twin in 
the pair. X. is the set of observed variables that vary by family, but not across twins, 
i.e., family background variables. F^； (j = 1, 2) is the firm characteristics dummy for 
twin j in family i. Z力.(j = 1, 2) is a set of variables that vary across the twins. 
A within-twin-pair or FE estimator of /? for identical twins, P fe is based on 
the first difference of equations (2) and (3): 
(4) y丨, - = PiPu - Pii) + KZi, - Z,,) + ( f , , - � ) 
4 Data 
The data we use are derived from the Chinese Twins Survey (CTS) which was 
carried out by the Urban Survey Unit (USU) of the National Bureau of Statistics 
(NBS) during June and July, 2002, in five cities of China, funded by the Research 
Grants Council of Hong Kong. Based on existing twins questionnaires in the United 
States and elsewhere, the survey covered a wide range of socioeconomic information. 
The questionnaire was designed in close consultation with Mark Rosenzweig and 
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Chinese experts in the Statistical Bureau. Adult twins aged from 18 to 65 (i.e., 
1942-1986 birth cohorts) were identified by the local Statistical Bureau through 
various channels, including colleagues, friends, relatives, newspaper advertising, 
neighborhood notices, neighborhood management committees, and household 
records in the public security bureau. Overall, these channels permit a roughly equal 
probability for contacting all twins in these cities, and in this sense, the twins sample 
obtained is approximately representative. (The within-twins estimation method used 
for this study controls for the first-order effects of any unobserved characteristics that 
might have led to the selection of twins pairs into the sample.) Questionnaires were 
completed through household face-to-face personal interviews. The survey was 
conducted with considerable care, including several site checks by Junsen Zhang and 
experts from the National Bureau of Statistics. With appropriate discussion with 
Mark Rosenzweig and other experts, data input was closely supervised and 
monitored by Junsen Zhang himself during July and August, 2002. 
This is the first socioeconomic twins data set in China and perhaps the first in 
Asia. The data set includes rich household socioeconomic information for 
respondents in five cities: Chengdu, Chongqing, Haerbin, Hefei and Wuhan. 
Altogether there are 4,683 observations, in which 3,012 observations are from twins 
households. For the sample of twins, we can distinguish whether they are identical 
(MZ) or non-identical twins. We consider a pair of twins identical if both twins 
respond that they have identical hair color, look, gender and age. We have completed 
questionnaires from 3,002 individuals, among which 2,996 are twin individuals and 6 
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are triplet individuals. Of these 3,002 individuals, we have 605 complete pairs of 
identical twins (1,810 individuals). For 430 of these pairs (860 individuals) we have 
complete information on earnings, firm attributes, education and other variables for 
both twins in the pair. The survey for non-twin households was conducted at the 
same time as the twin survey and using the same questionnaire. 
Table 1 summarizes descriptive statistics of MZ twins along with that of all 
twins and the whole sample, which includes both twins and non-twins; such a 
comparison helps us determine whether the sample of identical twins are 
representative of the whole. As shown in Column (1), MZ twins, with the average 
age of 37 years old, have a mean wage of RMB 911 Yuan per month, and have been 
working for about 14 years. About 61 percent of them are males and 65 percent of 
them are married now. About 4.4 percent of them work in foreign firms and 58 
percent in large firms. Workers belong to industry of commercial and social service 
are 26 and 15 percent respectively. Compared with the whole sample reported in 
Column (3), MZ twins are younger and more educated, and more of them are in 
foreign, large and commercial firms. 
We also provide statistics of within-twin-pair variation for ownership, firm size 
and industry type in Table 2. Near 30 percent of all the MZ twins enter firms of 
different ownership and firm size. The variation in industry type is even larger; with 
about 43 percent of them have differences for the industry they belong to. 
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5 Empirical Results 
This section reports our estimated return to foreign firm, firm size and industry type. 
We begin with the basic OLS model, using the whole sample, and then MZ twins, 
which allow us to check the representativeness of the MZ twins. After that we carry 
out the fixed-effects estimations for the MZ twins to investigate the effect after 
controlling unobservable ability and family effect. 
5.1 Return to Foreign Firms 
Table 3 provides the results of OLS and FE estimates of return to firms of different 
ownership, collective and private firms are used as control group. The dependent 
variable is the logarithm of monthly earnings including both bonus and subsidies. 
The t-statistics are calculated using robust standard errors. 
5.1.1 OLS Regressions Using the Whole Sample 
We start with a simple regression with the firm ownership and city dummies as 
independent variables, collective and private firms are used as control group. As 
shown in column 1，ownership forms indeed matter for earnings. The coefficients 
on both the SOE and foreign dummies are positive and significant at the one percent 
level. The earnings premium for workers in SOEs was 22.4 percent, and that for 
foreign firms is as large as 37.6 percent. 
The return to foreign firms and SOEs remain significant when we control worker 
characteristics including age, age-squared, gender and marital status. As shown by 
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column 2, the SOE and foreign firm dummies remain large and significant. The 
estimated returns to foreign firms and SOEs only change slightly (column 2 vs. 
column 1)，suggesting that omitting these variables only results in a small bias. 
Gender has the expected positive sign with men on average earning 18 percent more 
than women. Age has a concave effect on earnings with the coefficient on age 
positive and that on age squared negative. We do not find a marriage premium, since 
the married dummy is not significant at a conventional level. 
In column 3 we add two important human capital variables: education and tenure. 
Controlling for these two variables reduces the return to foreign firm by 9 percent, 
suggesting that a fraction of estimated returns in columns 1 and 2 are actually due to 
the effect of education and tenure. The return to SOEs declines by more than half to 
7.8 percent. These results indicate that individuals entering foreign firms and SOEs 
have higher levels of education and tenure. As expected, education and tenure have 
positive effects on earnings. One more year of education raises earnings by 7.3 
percent, which is comparable to the estimated return to education in the literature 
drawing on Chinese data (see e.g. Zhang et al., 2005). Tenure also has a significant 
coefficient, with one more year of tenure increases one's earnings by about one 
percent. 
5.1.2 OLS Regressions Using the MZ Twins Sample 
In this subsection, we repeat the same OLS regressions using the MZ twins sample. 
Comparing the OLS results of the whole sample with those of the MZ twins sample 
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is a way to check the representativeness of our twins sample. Since we only use MZ 
twins, the sample size is reduced to 860 (or 430 pair of twins). 
Regression results reported in columns 4-6 of Table 3 suggest that our MZ twins 
sample is quite representative. The estimated coefficients for most of the variables 
are similar to those of the whole sample. For instance, comparing column 6 to 
column 3, the return to foreign firms is 26.6 percent when using our MZ twins 
sample, slightly different from that estimated using the whole sample, (30.2 percent 
in column 3). The results regarding SOEs is different: the coefficients on the SOE 
dummy are comparable for the two samples without including the education and 
tenure variables, but it becomes much smaller when these two covariates are 
controlled for the MZ twins sample. These results suggest that MZ twins in SOE 
firms are more educated than other SOE workers. Education itself still has a 
significant positive effect on earning, similar to the situation using the whole sample. 
To summarize, the OLS estimates of the foreign ownership premium are rather 
large. Even after controlling many covariates, the remaining effect of foreign firm on 
earnings is 0.266 in column 6 of Table 3. However, we still do not know how much 
of the return to foreign firms estimated by OLS is due to the real ownership effect, 
and how much is due to the unmeasured ability or family effect. 
5.1.3 Within-Twin-Pair Estimations 
Our within-twin-pair estimates show that there is indeed a premium for foreign firms, 
though the premium for SOEs is completely gone. As shown by columns 7-9 of 
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Table 3，the coefficients on the foreign dummy in the FE model are very similar to 
those of OLS estimates. Take column 9 for example, after controlling for a worker's 
human capital attributes, the foreign firm premium is 0.306, which is slightly larger 
than the OLS estimate of 0.266. These results suggest that unobserved ability does 
not account for wage premium from foreign firms. Put it in a different way, foreign 
firms indeed pay more than domestic firms to individuals with identical ability. 
Interestingly, the coefficients on the SOE dummy become very small and 
insignificant for the FE estimates, and even become negative in column 9. These 
results suggest that SOEs do not have a wage premium compared to private firms, 
and SOE workers have higher earnings because they have better unobserved human 
capital and/or family background. 
It is also interesting to compare the within-twin-pair estimates of the control 
variables to the OLS variables. The return to marital status remains insignificant. The 
return to education declines dramatically from 0.074 to 0.024, which indicates that 
the OLS estimate of the return to education is biased upward by more than two 
hundred percent. The FE estimates also show that job tenure is rewarded, with one 
more year of tenure increasing earnings by 1.9 percent. 
5.2 Return to Large Firms 
5.2.1 OLS Regressions Using the Whole Sample 
Table 4 provides the results of OLS and FE estimates of return to firms of different 
size; small firms are used as control group. 
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Column 1-3 provide OLS estimates for the whole sample. Column 1 shows the 
results for a simple regression when only firm size and city dummies are included as 
independent variables. The coefficient indicates that firm size indeed affect earnings. 
Entering a large firm will increase earnings by 12 percent, significant at 1%. 
According to column 2 in Table 4, after controlling for worker characteristics of 
age, age-squared, gender and marital status, the return to large firms remains 
significant. The estimated returns only decrease a little bit in magnitudes. This result 
suggests that omitting these variables does not generate great bias. The effects of age 
and gender have expected signs and significant t-statistics. Men earn on average 18 
percent more than women, similar to that in Table 3 when estimating the ownership 
effect. There is also a concave relationship between income and age, with 
significantly positive coefficient of age and negative one of age-squared. Marital 
status still has no great influential effect on earnings, with a coefficient of 0.019 and 
t-value of 0.59. 
After controlling for the two important human capital covariates of education 
and tenure in column 3, we find that the return to large firms decreases by 1.4 percen. 
This result suggests that some of previous return we estimated is actually due to the 
education and tenure effect, individuals entering larger firms always have higher 
levels of education and tenure. Education and tenure still have significantly positive 
effects on earnings as expected. One more year of education raises earnings by 7.6 
percent and return to tenure is about one percent. 
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5.2.2 OLS Regressions Using the MZ Twins Sample 
Regression results reported in column 4-6 of Table 4 suggest that our MZ twins 
sample is quite representative. The estimated coefficients for most of the variables 
are similar to those of the whole sample. For instance, comparing column 4 to 
column 1, returns to large firms for MZ twins is 7.2 percent, comparable to 7.2 
percent for the whole sample. The concave relationship between income and age still 
exist, though the coefficients of age and age squared become greater and more 
significant. The coefficients of male and education are similar to that using the whole 
sample: men earn 19 percent more than women; one year more education raises 
earnings by 7.6 percent. 
To summarize, when using the MZ twins sample, the OLS estimates of return to 
firm size exhibit similar patterns to that of the whole sample with a premium from 
larger firms of more than 7 percent. 
5.2.3 Within-Twin-Pair Estimations 
Our within-twin-pair estimates show that there is indeed a premium from large firms. 
Column 7-9 of Table 4 report the fixed-effects estimates for Equation (4). After 
controlling for other covariates, FE estimate gives a return to large firms of about 10 
percent, even larger than that using OLS, as shown in column 9. This also suggests 
that a negative bias may exist as more capable individuals go to small firms, which 
leads to the relative smaller premium observed. Actually large firms pay more to 
individuals of the same ability, however, those go to large firms generally are less 
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capable, and thus what observed is a specious fact that there is no wage differential 
for firms of various sizes. 
To compare the within-twin-pair estimates of the control variables to the OLS 
variables, the return to marital status keeps insignificant. The return to education 
declines dramatically from 0.076 to 0.024, indicating an OLS estimate that is biased 
upward by twice, very similar to the situation in Table 3. 
5.3 Inter-industry Wage Differentials 
5.3.1 OLS Regressions Using the Whole Sample 
Table 5 provides the results of OLS and FE estimates of return to firms of different 
industry, manufacturing firms are used as the control group. 
Column 1-3 provide OLS estimates for the whole sample. Our results indicate 
that inter-industry wage differences indeed exist. Column 1 shows the results for a 
simple regression when only industry type and city dummies are included as 
independent variables. The coefficient indicates that there are returns from both 
industries of commercial and social service. Entering commercial firms have 
earnings increase by 10.9 percent while the return to social service is 23 percent. 
According to column 2 in Table 5，after controlling for the age, age-squared, 
gender and marital status, the industry effect remains significant. There is also a 
significantly positive coefficient of age and negative one of age-squared. Men earn 
on average 20.6 percent more than women, similar to that in Table 3 and Table 4 
when estimating the ownership and size effect. Marital status still has no great 
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influential effect on earnings, with a coefficient of 0.039 and t-value of 1.17. 
In column 3 we control for the two important human capital covariates of 
education and tenure. The coefficient of commercial declines from 0.183 to 0.130, 
and that of social service decreases to 0.173. Such results suggest that individuals 
that are better educated and have higher tenure always go to sectors of commercial 
and social service. Education and tenure still have significantly positive effects on 
earnings as expected. One more year of education raises earnings by 7.2 percent. 
Tenure also has a significant coefficient, with one more year of tenure increases 
one's earning by 1.4 percent. 
5.3.2 OLS Regressions Using the MZ Twins Sample 
Regression results reported in column 4-6 of Table 5 suggest that our MZ twins 
sample is quite representative. The estimated coefficients for most of the variables 
are similar to those of the whole sample in that both commercial and social service 
sector give significant premiums. Returns to commercial and social service sector are 
shown to be greater for MZ twins than that of whole sample. For instance, after 
controlling all the covariates in column 6, returns to commercial sector are 0.210 for 
MZ twins, compared with that of 0.130 for the whole sample in column 3. The 
concave relationship between income and age still exist, though the coefficients of 
age and age squared become greater and more significant. The coefficients of male 
and education are similar to that using the whole sample: men earn 20.1 percent more 
than women; one year more education raises earnings by 6.9 percent. 
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To summarize, when using the MZ twins sample, the OLS estimates of the 
industry exhibits similar patterns to that of the whole sample in that there are positive 
returns to both sectors of commercial and social service. 
5.3.3 Within-Twin-Pair Estimations 
Column 7-9 of Table 5 report the fixed-effects estimates for Equation (4). Both 
returns to commercial and social service sectors decrease dramatically in magnitude 
and significance. Positive returns from commercial sector completely disappear. 
Coefficients for social service decline about two thirds to about 7 percent and 
become insignificant. These results suggest that the premium we observed from OLS 
models are mainly due to ability and/or family background factors. Individuals with 
more human capital usually go to the sectors of commercial and social service. 
To compare the within-twin-pair estimates of the control variables to the OLS 
variables, the return to marital status keeps insignificant. The return to education 
shrink dramatically from 0.069 to 0.021, indicating an OLS estimate that is biased 
upward by twice, very similar to the situation in Table 3 and Table 4. 
5.4 Effects of Ownership, Firm Size, and Industry Type on Earnings 
5.4.1 OLS Regressions Using the Whole Sample 
Table 6 reports the results of OLS and FE estimates of returns to firms of different 
ownership, firm size and industry type together. Covariates of age, gender, marital 
status, education and tenure are controlled though not reported in the table. Column 2, 
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5 and 8 include control variables of age, age squared, gender, and marital status. 
Column 3, 6 and 9 include two more covariates of education and tenure. 
Column 1-3 provide OLS estimates for the whole sample. Column 1 shows the 
results for a simple regression consider only firm characteristics as ownership, size 
and industry type as well as city dummies. Firstly, our results indicate ownership 
indeed matters for earnings. Return to SOEs exhibits to be 17.7 percent while that to 
foreign firms is 35.8 percent, both significant at 1% level. After controlled for the 
covariates, return to SOEs decreases greatly to less than 5 percent, indicating that 
more educated workers go to SOE firms. The situation is similar to that in Table 3, 
where firm size and industry type effect are not considered. There remains a positive 
and significant return of 29.1 percent to foreign firms after controlled for all the 
covariates. Secondly, firm size also affects earnings. Larger firms generate a 
premium of 11.6 percent after controlling for human capitals. Finally, inter-industry 
wage differences still exist. For instance, after controlling for all the covariates in 
column 3, commercial and social service sector generates a premium of 18 and 22.3 
percent respectively. 
5.4.2 OLS Regressions Using the MZ Twins Sample 
According to Column 4-6 of Table 6, our MZ twins generally can represent the 
whole sample except that for firm size. For example, when considering ownership, 
significant and positive returns to SOEs disappear after controlling education and 
tenure. Wage premium from foreign firms remains at 24 percent compared with 29.1 
36 
percent using the whole sample. For firm size, MZ twins also generate similar results 
as the whole sample. Returns to large firms are reported to be 9.9 percent, 
comparable to 11.6 percent using the whole sample. For different types of industry, 
there are higher returns using MZ twins compared with that of the whole sample. For 
instance, commercial sector generate a positive returns of 23.2 percent in column 6， 
larger than 18 percent in column 3. 
5.4.3 Within-Twin-Pair Estimations 
Column 7-9 of Table 6 reports the fixed-effects estimates for Equation (4) combining 
all the firm characteristics of ownership, size, and industry type. According to our 
results, foreign, large firms and social service sector indeed pay more than other 
firms, while a large fraction of returns to SOEs and commercial firms are due to 
ability and/or family effect. 
Like reported in column 9 of Table 3，returns to SOEs disappear using the FE 
estimates. The return to foreign firms is reported as 27.7 percent, which is 
comparable to that of 24 percent using OLS estimates. Similar to the case 
encountered when only consider firm size effect in Table 4, FE estimates give a 
coefficient of 0.116, even greater than 0.099 under OLS for large firms. For the case 
of industry, the situation is of something difference. Dislike considering industry 
type individually, after combing ownership effect together, social service sector 
remains about half of the premium under OLS, indicating a true premium of 11.2 
percent after controlling for ability. Combing all the firm attributes together, FE 
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estimates also give larger return to commercial sector than estimating industry type 
alone, however, it is not significant. Such results indicate that part of inter-industry 
wage differentials, especially those from commercial sector are due to ability and/or 
family background effect. 
5.5 OLS and FE Estimates Considering Working Hours 
As the dependent variable we use in previous estimates is the logarithm of monthly 
earnings, one may argue that the wage premium from special firms such as the 
foreign ones may due to their longer working hours. In this section, we use weekly 
working hours and hourly earnings as dependent variables to test whether returns to 
firms of special characteristics are results of longer working hours there. 
5.5.1 OLS and FE Estimates Using Working Hours 
Table 7 shows the OLS and FE estimates of ownership effect on working hours. As 
shown in column 1-6，OLS estimates indicate less working time in SOEs and foreign 
firms both for the whole sample and MZ twins. When within-twin-pair estimate is 
used, SOEs remain a negative effect on working time, while foreign firms generate 
an insignificant positive effect on working time. Such results suggest that employees 
in SOEs really work for fewer hours, but the observed less working hours in foreign 
firms are actually due to employees' higher efficiency. 
Our results in Table 8 indicate that larger firms have less working hours than 
small ones under OLS models. However, FE estimates generate insignificant positive 
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effect on working time, indicating employees' efficiency in large firms. 
Table 9 shows the OLS and FE estimates of industry effect on working hours. 
OLS estimates for the whole sample exhibit significantly positive effects from 
commercial and social service sectors. The magnitudes of such effects decline when 
using MZ twins sample. For instance, social service sector gives about 1.347 longer 
working hours per week using the whole sample, which declines to 0.754 using MZ 
twins. Similar to OLS estimates, FE estimates have an insignificant positive effect on 
working time for commercial sector. Social service sector has no special affluence on 
working time using FE model, indicating relatively less efficiency of this industry. 
Table 10 gives the estimates combining all the ownership, firm size and industry 
type factors. None of the firms of special characteristics generate significant longer 
working hours than the control groups using FE estimates. 
To summarize, firms that pay higher wages in the previous section, such as 
foreign and large firms, do not have significant longer working hours than the control 
groups. 
5.5.2 OLS and FE Estimates Using Hourly Earnings 
In this section, we use hourly wage instead of monthly earnings as dependent 
variable to estimate Equation (1) and (4). Table 11 to 13 report OLS and FE 
estimates of the effect of ownership, size, and industry type individually, and Table 
14 gives results combining the three factors together. The results are very similar to 
that reported from Section 5.1 to 5.4, foreign and large firms, as well as firms of 
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social service indeed pay higher wage than others. 
For example, return to the foreign firm exhibits to be 21.7 percent in column 9 in 
Table 14，compared with 27.7 percent in Table 6 using monthly earning rate. For the 
same column, large firm exhibits to pay a premium of 10.7 percent, comparable with 
11.6 percent using monthly earnings. Besides, social service industry give a 14.4 
percent premium compared with 11.2 percent using monthly earning rate. 
To summarize, using hourly earnings generate similar results as that using 
monthly earnings. This situation indicates that wage premium from firms of special 
attributes is not due to longer working hours. 
6 Conclusions 
This study estimates the wage returns of firms with different characteristics as 
foreign ownership, large size and different industry type. We use the sample of 
Chinese MZ twins to control for the unobserved ability and family effect. 
The empirical results suggest that there is a true wage premium from foreign 
firms. The return to foreign firms under FE estimates is reported as 27.7 percent, 
comparable to that of 24 percent using OLS estimates, indicating that foreign firms 
really pay more to individuals with the same ability. 
For the case of firm size, our FE estimates give a premium of 11.6 percent to 
large firms, even lager large as that using OLS. This fact suggests a negative bias 
may exist that more capable individuals will go to small firms. We try to explain as 
that smart people usually enjoy two benefits provided by small firms: firstly, small 
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firms usually have less constrains and rules, providing a more flexible working 
environment where capable workers can deal with problems more efficiently; 
secondly, small firms usually require employees to be an all-rounder due to their 
limited resources, where capable individuals can develop their potential in various 
aspects and get a sense of achievements. 
Industry differentials also exhibit to exist in social service sector. Our FE 
estimates give a premium of 11.2 percent, which is about half of that under OLS 
model. Return to commercial sector almost disappears after using FE estimates, 
indicating higher return in commercial firms are generally due to the higher 
capability of employees in that sector. 
We also use hourly earnings rate instead of monthly one to test whether the wage 
premium is due to longer working hours of such firms. The results confirm that there 
indeed existing wage premiums from firms of special characteristics mentioned 
above, which generally have no relationship with longer working hours. 
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Table 1 ： Descriptive Statistics of Different Samples 
Variable MZ twins All twins Whole sample 
W (2) (3) 
Earnings (monthly wage rate include bonus and subsidies in RMB) 910.932 (512.939) 881.028 (569.139) 886.139 (559.652) 
Age 36.837 (9.128) 37.023 (9.296) 38.820 (9.764) 
Male 0.605 (0.489) 0.600 (0.490) 0.576 (0.494) 
Married 0.649 (0.478) 0.644 (0.479) 0.696 (0.460) 
Years of education 12.452 (2.843) 12.101 (2.923) 12.058 (2.918) 
Tenure (number of years working full time since age 16) 14.227 (9.524) 14.266 (9.621) 15.856 (9.998) 
Ownership 
SOE 0.638(0.481) 0.612 (0.488) 0.651 (0.477) 
Foreign firm 0.044 (0.206) 0.045 (0.208) 0.037 (0.190) 
Collective & private firm 0.317(0.466) 0.343 (0.475) 0.312(0.463) 
Size 
Small firm 0.417 (0.493) 0.444 (0.497) 0.450 (0.498) 
Large firm 0.583 (0.493) 0.556 (0.497) 0.550 (0.498) 
Industry 
Manufacturing 0.256 (0.437) 0.262 (0.440) 0.263 (0.440) 
Commercial 0.147 (0.354) 0.146 (0.354) 0.139 (0.346) 
Social service 0.416 (0.493) 0.417 (0.493) 0.441 (0.497) 
Farming, utility, construction & oUiers 0.181 (0.386) 0.175 (0.380) 0.157 (0.364) 
Observations ^ 2329 Note: 
1 • We consider a pair of twins identical (MZ twins) if both of them report that they have the same hair color, look, 
age, and gender. Therefore, we have 430 complete pairs (i.e., 860 individuals) with complete information. 
2. The industry of social service here includes social service, social welfare, education, scientific research, 
government agencies, and other social organizations.. 48 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of MZ Twins 
No. of Twin Pairs Proportion (%) 
Within-twin-pair difference in ownership 
Both of the same ownership 311 ； 72.3 
Not of the same ownership 119 27.7 
Sum 430 100 
Within-twin-pair difference in Firm Size 
Both in the same size 315 73.3 
Not in the same size 115 26.7 
Sum 430 100 
Within-twin-pair difference in Industry T>^ pe 
Both in the same industry 247 57.4 
Not in the same industry 183 42.6 
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